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The role of the public agency as a pacer of private sector innovation has been emphasised 
over the recent years, especially in the context of the EU. The general ambition has been to 
encourage public agencies to actively stimulate private sector innovation by requesting 
innovation instead of procuring currently existing products. This has also triggered an 
increased interest among researchers and practitioners to identify examples of best practice 
where public agencies have successfully procured innovation. Rather than addressing this 
demand-oriented perspective this paper focuses on the public agency as an adopter of 
private-sector innovation, and how this mechanism can contribute to innovation in general. 
The theoretical point of departure is diffusion theory, with an emphasis on the role of 
institutions as identified in systemic approaches to innovation studies. A particular concern of 
this paper is those institutions that hinder or enable adoption of an innovation in an 
organisational context. The paper draws on an explorative case study looking at the 
introduction of a new catheter into the English National Health Service supply chain and its 
diffusion among NHS trusts in England. Different institutional factors are identified which 
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The role of the public agency as a pacer of private sector innovation has been 
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identify examples of best practice where public agencies have successfully procured 
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focuses on the public agency as an adopter of private-sector innovation, and how this 
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new catheter into the English National Health Service supply chain and its diffusion 
among NHS trusts in England. Different institutional factors are identified which have 




The research reported in this paper ultimately aims to contribute to knowledge 
relating to how the public sector can stimulate or pace (Gregersen, 1992) private 
sector innovation. In an economy characterised by global competition, it is commonly 
agreed that innovation is critical for our future prosperity. In line with this perception, 
the role of public procurement as a means to stimulate private sector innovation has 
been increasingly emphasised in the last decade (Edler et al, 2006).  This 
understanding is evident at the European level where public agencies have been 
described as ”big market players” which ”have powerful means to stimulate private 
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investment in research and innovation” (European Commission, 2005, p. 8). In UK, 
initiatives are already in progress to make government “a smarter customer” where 
stimulating private sector innovation is a central theme (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2004, p.11). It has been estimated that public procurement contributes to 
around 16 % of European GDP (EC, 2004). For some countries, UK for instance, and 
in some market areas e.g. medical equipment, the share might be even bigger. This 
means that the public sector constitutes a purchasing power that, if managed 
accordingly, could positively affect innovation.  
 
Acknowledging the latent potential in public procurement the demand side of 
innovative public procurement has been emphasised (see e.g. Rolfstam, 2005, Edler & 
Gerghiou, 2007). The issue that relates to the general theme running through this 
paper is how public agencies adopt emerging private sector innovations. As a 
complement to the prevailing focus on developmental technology procurement 
(Edquist et al, 2000, p. 21) this paper tries to add to existing literature by emphasising 
the role of adaptive public technology procurement of goods and services. In the light 
of the often mentioned public purchasing power (e.g. Borg, 2003), and the perception 
that “without diffusion, innovation have little social or economic impact” (Hall, 2005, 
p. 459) the objective of this paper is to study further how a large public agency adopts 
private sector innovations. Following from an institutional approach on innovation 
studies, as will be developed below, the focus is on how institutions may affect 
diffusion processes within organisations. This is further justified in the perception that 
“[c]ompared with other aspects of diffusion research… there have been relatively few 
studies of how the social or communication structure affects the diffusion and 
adoption of innovations in a system” (Rogers, 1995, p. 25). 
 
The empirical material included in the paper consists of an explorative case study of 
an attempt by the English National Health Service (NHS) to procure and diffuse a 
new catheter throughout its Trusts.  
2. Theoretical Background 
 
Public Procurement occurs when a public agency puchases goods and/ or services 
from an outside body (c.f. Arrowsmith, 2005, p. 1). The goods and services may be 
either regular, off the shelf-products or innovative products which have been 
delivered as a result of development carried out by the supplier (Edquist et al, 2000). 
The literature discussed in the following sub-sections reflects the interest of the latter, 
i.e. public procurement as a means to stimulate innovation and diffusion.  
 
2.1 Public Procurement and Innovation 
 
To use public procurement indirectly as a means to implement other policies what 
Arnould (2004) refers to as secondary policies (Arnould, 2004), is far from a new 
phenomenon (McCrudden, 2004). For example, recent research concerns the role of 
public procurement in relation to market creation (Caldwell et al, 2005) and how 
sustainable procurement may stimulate supplier-innovation in sustainable 
technologies (Walker et al, 2006). Public procurement has also been used to adopt 
digital technology in hearing aids in England (Phillips et al, 2006). The public sector 
also applies a de facto technology policy through procurement and first use of   5
innovations (Dalpé et al, 1991). Regarding innovation specifically, a public agency 
can influence demand by direct procurement, acting as a proxy customer (e.g. by 
creating standards) or as a linkage creator between suppliers and users (Rothwell, 
1994). The demand-side approach, i.e. where “a public agency places an order for a 
product or system which does not exist at the time, but which could probably be 
developed within a reasonable period” (Edquist et al, 2000, p. 5) also suggest that 
public technology procurement may be a useful tool to stimulate innovation. The 
neglect of using public procurement in this way, and the need for resurrecting it as a 
means to stimulate innovation has recently been acknowledged (Edler and Georghiou, 
2007).  
 
The position taken here, as argued by Uyarra and Flanagan (2009), is that the 
application of public procurement as a means to stimulate innovation involves not 
only public technology procurement where “a public agency places an order for 
something which does not exist at the time” (Edquist et al, 2000, p. 5). One example 
of such a different situation is when private sector suppliers approach public procurers 
with unsolicited offers of new innovative products. This goes beyond the process of 
public technology procurement as defined above. In order to fund future innovations, 
suppliers need to secure returns of investment in research and development. In sectors 
dominated by the public sector, suppliers offering unsolicited innovative products or 
services may be dependent on public agencies ability to adopt innovation. In that 
sense, public sector adoption of innovation may be critical for stimulation of 
innovation in a long-term perspective. Thus, by emphasising this other aspect of 
public procurement, this paper sets out to further explore and essentially expand the 
understanding of public procurement in relation to innovation.  
 
2.2 Innovation, Diffusion and Adoption 
 
To provide a theoretical platform a discussion on the relationship between diffusion, 
adoption and innovation is necessary. These concepts are to some extent overlapping 
as they all capture aspects relevant for the purposes of this paper. An innovation may 
be seen as an invention that becomes commercially successful on a market, i.e. 
adopted and then diffused by users. An innovation may also be incrementally altered 
over its diffusion time, i.e. exposed to post innovation improvements (Coombs et al, 
1987, p. 130), which might affect the diffusion curve. In that sense diffusion and 
innovation are interlinked. It may sometimes be hard to conceptually distinguish 
between diffusion and adoption as both these concepts to large extent try to capture 
how an innovation is received. One way of attaining such a distinction is to regard the 
former as the study on aggregate level, e.g. on a sample of firms or adopting units 
among which adoption would take place. Adoption studies understood in this 
perspective focus on the individual unit, e.g. a person and try to further understand the 
individual adoption behaviour (Lissoni and Metcalfe, 1996). Still both concepts 
capture adoption behaviour in relation to a certain innovation.  
 
Diffusion has been at least implicitly taken into account in research on technological 
development and economic progress since the days of Joseph Schumpeter. The 
methods originally came from social sciences other than economics or innovation 
studies (Lissoni and Metcalfe, 1996). Typical diffusion studies conducted in the 1960s 
were devoted to evaluation of development programs in agriculture, family planning,   6
public health and nutrition in Latin America, Africa and Asia (Rogers, 1995). Up to 
the end of 1970s diffusion research typically dealt with single products displayed in s-
curve diagrams (ibid, 1995). Modern diffusion research is less focused on diffusion 
curves but has taken into account that diffusion is affected by other technologies and 
other social or economic developments. Compatibility, interrelatedness and co-
development are themes in this multi-technology perception of diffusion (Lissoni and 
Metcalfe, 1996). There is also a vast variety of literature dealing with diffusion issues 
in health service organisations (Greenhalgh et al, 2004). 
 
When diffusion is studied, three elements are considered in the analysis. These are 
“the innovation which diffuses, the population of potential adopters and their process 
of decision making” (Coombs et al, 1987, p. 121). For the purposes of this paper, 
innovation is defined as “an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an 
individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers, 1995, p 11). Diffusion then, is this idea, 
practice or object “communicated through certain channels over time among the 
members of a social system” (Rogers, 1995, p. 5.) The ‘newness’ in this context is 
connected to the decision to adopt a certain innovation. An innovation might be 
known by adopters prior to adoption. It has to be known in order to eventually 
become adopted. It is also likely that the innovation has “at least some degree of 
benefit for its potential adopters” (Rogers, 1995, p. 13). Given the newness of an 
innovation, it is also accompanied by uncertainty. The decision to adopt an innovation 
is generally determined by how it is perceived by adopters.  
 
Some characteristic features of diffusion and adoption processes occurring within 
organisations need to be further discussed. To do so, the starting point is Roger’s 
definition of a social system. According to this author, a social system is defined as “a 
set of interrelated units that are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a 
common goal” (Rogers, 1995, p. 23). Units of such a system may be individuals, 
informal groups, organisations, and/or subsystems (ibid, p. 23). There are some 
fundamental differences between, for instance, individual consumers’ adoption of an 
innovative end-consumer product and an innovation adopted by an organisation. 
Following Rogers (ibid), individuals within an organisation may sometimes not be 
able to adopt an innovation before the organisation, i.e. somebody with authority over 
the organisation, has decided to do so. Also, the decision made by an organisation to 
adopt a certain innovation does not by necessity mean that an individual within the 
organisation will do so directly. In other words, the decision whether or not to reject 
or adopt an innovation is not as straight-forward in an organisational context as it 
might be elsewhere. These special characteristics of adoption of innovations within 




The focus of this paper is not so much on the decisions per se as determinants of 
diffusion and adoption of an innovation in a social system. Rather, as emphasised by 
systemic approaches to innovation studies (Dosi et al, 1988; Lundvall, 1992; Edquist 
and Johnson, 1997; Hollingsworth, 2000), the interest here rests on the assertion that 
institutions need to be taken into account. If innovation is understood as a social 
process characterised by interaction institutions might be understood as “the rules of 
the game in a society… that shape interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3) or as “sets of   7
habits, routines, rules, norms and laws, which regulate the relations between people 
and shape human interaction” (Johnson, 1992, p. 26). Institutions can also be regarded 
as “systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions” 
(Hodgson, 2006, p. 2). From an institutional perspective, the decision weather or not 
to adopt or reject an innovation will are treated analytically as institutionally 
determined. Understood in that sense, institutions may work as enablers of 
innovation. It may also be the case, as will be developed further below, that 
institutions can work as barriers to innovation. 
 
Institutions manifest on different levels in society. Super-national law such as the EC 
Directives on Public Procurement, transpositions of these laws into national public 
procurement law, specific directives and policies for specific public agencies, 
endogenous institutions or rationalities (c.f. Gregersen, 1992) among potential 
suppliers or collaborators, individual habits and values are all examples of institutions 
relevant for analysis of public procurement of innovation. Probably this institutional 
diversity is the reason for the lack of consensus among scholars on what is meant by 
institutions or institutional analysis (Hollingsworth, 2000; Edquist and Johnson, 1997) 
and also the reason why “there is a difficult road ahead before institutions can be 
weaved into a coherent theory of the determinants of economic performance” (Nelson 
and Sampat, 2001, p. 32). Acknowledging the plethora of approaches and 
perspectives on institutional analysis some authors have attempted to order the 
institutional landscape. Some talk about institutional hierarchies (Edquist, 1997; 
Coriat and Weinstein, 2002) while Hollingsworth (2000) settles with attempts to order 
institutions based on the degree of permanence and stability. One important reflection 
which comes from these perspectives concerns the multifaceted way in which the 
institutional landscape affects innovation. A study of how institutions affect 
innovation or adoption “must engage in configurative analysis, recognizing that actors 
are not coordinated or governed by a single type of institutional arrangement” 
(Hollingsworth, 2000, p. 605). 
 
An adequate starting point for an institutional analysis is the insight that the existence 
of institutions is fundamental for any advanced society. Institutions reduce uncertainty 
and release cognitive and other resources. The reason why an institution exists is that 
it is somehow beneficial for its endorsers. Without institutions, any man-performed 
activity would require problem solving and decisions making about what to do and 
what to do next that would hinder any more advanced action from being performed. 
Institutions as, for example, language, technical standards, what side of the road one 
should drive etc. work as informational devices that “make it unnecessary to start life 
from scratch every day” (Johnson, 1992, p. 25). This implies in principle that a social 
system without institutions is not thinkable. Without institutions a social system 
would not be able to accumulate knowledge, or enable communication and therefore 
unable to sustain cumulative innovation.  
 
This also means that endorsement of any institution and the mere existence of it can 
be understood from an evolutionary perspective, i.e. that institutions exist because of 
historical success. This refinement process is visible for instance in the development 
of formal institutions such as the law regulating public procurement. Since the 1970s 
two major revisions of the EC Public Procurement Directives have taken place, one in 
the early 1990s and one in 2004 (European Commission, 2008). In that sense, 
institutions typically evolve slowly and reactive and therefore tend to lag behind   8
technical change. This may lead to mismatch problems “which prevent the full 
realization of the productivity potentials of technical innovations, which forestall the 
reallocation of resources and efforts from mature to emerging technologies, and which 
generally favour established technological trajectories to new ones” (Edquist and 
Johnson, 1997, p. 55). From this follows that institutions may also sometimes act as 
barriers preventing diffusion of innovation. This line of thinking raises a need to also 
consider the institutional aspect of introducing an innovation into an organisation – 
i.e. what some authors refer to as institutional coordination.  
 
One unfortunate tendency in current institutional analysis of innovation is that it 
typically tends to be limited to formal institutions, i.e. the legal and regulatory 
framework associated with a given innovation process. Although some authors 
acknowledge that the concept is much broader in scope (Edquist and Johnson, 1997; 
Hollingsworth, 2000), empirical innovation research taking into account that 
institutions may exist on different levels are rather scarce. For instance, within 
research interested in how institutions may affect possibilities for public procurement 
of innovation, the main focus has been on the legal frameworks as stipulated by the 
European Directives on Public Procurement (Edquist, Hommen and Tsipouri, 2000; 
Nyholm et al., 2001). The argument brought forward in this paper is that it is very 
problematic to make any general statements based on formal institutions only. 
Empirical research also suggests that in order to provide an adequate understanding, 
also other institutional levels need to be taken into account (Rolfstam, 2007). 
 
Here, the work of Coriat and Weinstein is a useful starting point. These authors 
distinguish between Type 1 and Type 2 institutions. The former type “is based on the 
criteria of authority and enforcement and posed on all the agents” (ibid., p. 283). 
These are typically formal laws that apply to everyone and cannot be waived (ibid., p. 
282), i.e. institutions  that traditionally have been emphasised in the innovation 
literature. Type 1 institutions also include an enforcement system that punishes any 
violation of the institutions. Type 2 institutions are the rules that individual agents 
decide to give themselves; they are “‘private’ collective agreements between groups 
of agents” (ibid., p. 283). Furthermore, these authors take into account institutional 
lifetime. They distinguish between Type A and Type B institutions where the former 
refers to long lasting institutions regulating reproduction of the society as a whole, 
whereas type B institutions are fixed in time. 
 
Also work by Jacoby, where the distinction is made between exogenous and 
endogenous institutions, respectively, is relevant (Jacoby, 1990). Exogenous 
institutions affect organisations from outside. They are imposed on organisations with 
little or no control from the organisation itself. Endogenous institutions typically 
evolve within organisations, and may also change as a result of learning within the 
organisation. The notion of endogenous institutions includes institutions codified in 
organisation specific policies or work instructions, and contracts. Understanding 
organisations (or sub-units within a large organisation) as developed through distinct 
evolutionary processes (Nelson and Winter, 1982), suggest also that organisations 
develop a unique set of endogenous institutions, i.e. a unique endogenous institutional 
set-up. One organisation may have elements in its institutional set-up that may 
prevent diffusion of a certain item. An innovation new to an organisation may or may 
not be institutionally matching with e.g. existing technology and already adopted 
standards, established ways of working, perceived values, strategic decisions,   9
rationalities, or established budgets. Thus certain endogenous institutional elements 
may act as barriers to diffusion of innovations into an organisation.  
 
2.4 Institutional Coordination 
 
Innovation theory based on institutional perspectives brings coordination and the 
coordinative functions of institutions at front. Research on innovation processes and 
systems points to “tension or mismatch between different kinds of designed 
institutions that often represent different levels of policy-making” (Edquist et al. 
1998, p. 38). Also Lundvall and Borrás (2005, p. 627) raise a concern for “how to 
coordinate policies affecting innovation”. Further, systemic approaches generally 
recognize the importance of complementarity within systems and therefore emphasize 
the importance of policy coordination – for example, “the coordination of support for 
R&D with support for … other kinds of learning, which operate through different 
mechanisms” (Edquist et al. 2001, p. 155). One of the general policy implications of 
systemic approaches is that it is important “to integrate and co-ordinate policy areas 
like R&D policies, educational policies, regional policies, and even macro-economic 
policies when formulating innovation policies” (Edquist, 2001, p. 230).   
 
Metcalfe (1995) has highlighted the issue of coordination in contrasting conventional 
or optimising approaches with evolutionary and systemic or adaptive approaches to 
innovation policy-making.  In the optimising approach, which is informed by 
equilibrium economics, the “favourite metaphor … is of the policy maker as a fully 
informed social planner who can identify and implement optima” for altering 
incentive schemes in order to change the behaviour of economic actors and thereby 
correct situations of market failure where “social and private welfare [are] out of step” 
(ibid. p. 30).  In contrast, the adaptive approach, based on evolutionary economics, 
does not presume “that the policy-maker has a superior understanding of market 
circumstances or technological information; rather what s/he does enjoy is a superior 
coordinating ability across a diverse range of institutions” (ibid. p. 31). It follows that 
‘superior coordinating ability’ must be harnessed to the cause of regenerating the 
diversity fundamental to economic progress by promoting and supporting 
‘experimental behaviour’ on the part of economic actors. In line with this thinking 
comes also a preference for appreciative policy making rather than strictly scientific 
(Lipsy and Carlaw, 1998). 
 
Public procurement of innovations is one of the policy instruments through which 
these purposes may be accomplished. In practice, however, the coordination of 
different actors and activities in relation to a specific policy instrument such as this is 
very likely to require effective coordination among different institutions. As stressed 
by both the Varieties of Capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) and Business Systems 
(Whitley, 2002) approaches to the study of national differences in innovation 
performance, co-ordination of innovative activities is governed by the ‘institutional 
environment’ and achieved through reliance upon institutions as ‘co-ordination 
mechanisms’. Thus, understanding how the institutional set-up affects innovation 
processes involves detailed analysis of the interplay between different kinds of 
institutions conceived as coordination mechanisms or governance structures - as 
discussed, for example, by Hollingsworth (2000). It follows that empirical studies 
addressing the coordination of institutions of this kind coordination are necessary in   10
order to round out an institutional innovation policy perspective on the public 
procurement of innovations. 
 
Public procurement can be regarded as a coordination tool in itself as it may be used 
to overcome institutional barriers and system failures (Edquist et al, 2000; Klein 
Woolthuis, Lankhuizen and Gilsing, 2005). This has for instance been applied with 
some success by Swedish public agencies in stimulating innovation in energy efficient 
technologies (Olerup, 2001) and also on the international level (IEA, 2000). On the 
other hand, coordination might also be necessary to sustain successful public 
procurement of innovation. In other words, if institutional barriers are not negotiated, 
projects involving public procurement of innovation may have to be terminated 
without rendering the intended result (Rolfstam, 2007). Institutional coordination may 
involve “developing, mobilizing, and coordinating competence among multiple 
buyers” (Hommen and Rolfstam, 2009, p. 27) in collaborative procurement projects. 
It may also involve institutional coordination more specifically targeting the diffusion 
of an innovation, which is the aspect given attention to in this paper. Central for such 
coordination are those institutions residing within organisations, i.e. endogenous 
institutions.  
 
2.5 Summary and research question 
 
The literature surveyed in the previous sections supports an understanding of 
innovation as a social process characterised by interactive learning guided by 
institutions. The perspective developed also underscores the linkages between 
innovation, diffusion and adoption necessary to take into account for understanding 
how innovations are diffused, for example, within organisations. In this perspective 
institutional coordination may be required to negotiate prevailing institutional barriers 
that may otherwise prevent diffusion of innovations. An institutional understanding of 
innovations raises a concern for institutional coordination in relation to enable 
innovation. In the innovation literature there is however a tendency to confine to 
formal or exogenous institutions such as national law and as a consequence fail to 
take into account other institutional levels that may also affect innovation. This 
narrow-minded focus on exogenous institutions may have negative consequences for 
institutional coordination, if coordination follows such an exogenous template, as 
barriers on endogenous institutional levels may be ignored.  
 
To justify further arguments of precaution against institutional coordination based on 
an exogenous institutional understanding only, this paper sets out to explore the 
institutional interplay and how it affects innovation diffusion. The research question 
addressed here is formulated as follows. How may coordination (or the lack thereof) 





The empirical work drawn on in this paper consists of a case study (Yin, 1994). 
Research design, data collection and analysis for the case study are summarised in the 
following subsections.   11
3.1 Research Design 
 
The case discussed in this paper was identified in the context of a study conducted in 
England and Sweden in 2006 involving multiple cases of public procurement. The 
study distinguished between three categories of public procurement projects, those 
that lead to innovation, those that involved procurement of mainly regular or of-the-
shelf goods, and a third category; public procurement projects that could have been 
innovative should some factors have been in place. Falling into the latter category, 
this case was selected through purposeful or theoretical sampling, i.e. chosen to fill a 
theoretical category (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 537). One of the objectives with the study 
was to compare different cases in the categories and eventually try to understand what 
causes public procurement projects to become innovative. Three public “sub-sectors” 
were selected, the health sector, national level procurement and local (municipality) 
procurement. Other branches of the public sector were excluded, e.g. the education 
sector as well as the military sector. Although indeed interesting as a stimulator of 
innovation, the military sector was excluded partly because of a perceived access 
problem and partly because the military sector operates under slightly different 
institutional conditions than civil public procurement. One selection criteria was the 
judged possibility to gain access to interview persons and data. In the English case 
such access was secured through to the rich network of practitioners connected to the 
research environment at the Centre for Research in Strategic Purchasing and Supply 
(CRISPS).  
 
For each of the selected sectors, a centrally positioned person likely to possess the 
relevant knowledge of the particular public sector was identified. This person was 
asked to identify one case for each category in the model. In the health sector the 
Director of Policy and Innovation at NHS PASA played this role. The current case 
was identified as belonging to the third category, i.e. public procurements that ‘could 
have been innovative should some factors had been in place’.  
 
3.2 Data Collection 
 
One strength associated with case studies is that it allows the use of a variety of 
sources (Denscombe, 1998). Yin (1994) lists six sources of evidence that might be 
used in case studies, documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, 
participant observations and physical artefacts where the three first-mentioned were 
drawn upon here. Examples of documentation and archival records consulted were 
policy reports from e.g. Department of Health, or different agencies within NHS, and 
academic literature such as reviews of research on the effects of silver coated 
catheters. 
 
In general, interviews can be carried out with different degrees of openness. They can 
be of an open-ended nature, i.e. where a respondent is prompted to share quite freely 
his or her knowledge, opinions and propositions of the matter being studied. On the 
other hand, interviews can also be carried out in a quite restricted and formal way in 
terms of the sampling procedures used and questions asked. The interviews carried 
out in this case study are semi-structured, belonging somewhere in between ‘open-
ended’ and ‘focused’ (Yin, 1994, p. 84) on this continuum. This means that questions 
are prepared in advance and it is expected that each interview will generate   12
corresponding answers to these questions as far as they are applicable. It also means 
that the interviews will be carried out in an open-minded and conversational manner 
where it is also strongly recommended to make use also of additional information 
provided by the respondent that goes beyond the questions. By doing so, the 
interviews might provide additional information of interest to the case. As part of the 
preparation, a case study protocol was developed. A cover letter to be sent to 
interviewees was also developed.  
 
Six persons contributed with data either through face-to-face interviews, telephone 
interviews or email communication. The way data was collected and informants 
searched for and selected resembled, once the case was identified, with conceptually-
driven sequential sampling (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 27). This means that the 
selection of interviewees was purposive, rather than random. Interviewed people were 
procurement practitioners involved in the process to procure the new catheter, 
members of the Rapid Review Panel, representatives for the supplier, Bard Ltd in 





The analysis uses applicable parts of the four elements that determine a diffusion 
process, as described by Rogers (1995). What has been included in the analysis is a 
selection of concepts used in a sensitizing way rather than a complete application of 
the entire framework. For instance, one element in the diffusion process is time. It is 
far too early to collect data about the full diffusion process as it has not yet have had 
the time to happen. 
 
Following Rogers (1995) the diffusion process is determined by the character of the 
innovation per se; the communication channels by which information about the 
innovation is communicated; time under which adopters go through a process that 
may lead to the decision adopt the innovation; and the social system, individuals, 
groups or organisations that are engaged in “joint problem-solving to accomplish a 
common goal” (ibid, 1995, p. 23). The characteristics that determine the diffusion of 
the innovation is determined by 1) the relative advantage of the innovation, i.e. to 
what degree the innovation is perceived as better than the item it supersedes; 2) the 
compatibility of the innovation, i.e. to what degree the innovation is perceived as 
consistent with existing values, past experiences and needs of potential adopters; 3) 
complexity, i.e. to what degree the innovation is perceived as difficult to understand 
and use; 4) trialability, i.e. to what degree it may be tested on a small scale before the 
decision whether or not to adopt the innovation is made; 5) observability, i.e. to what 
degree the results of the adoption are visible to others. 
 
The criteria briefly discussed in the previous paragraph are essentially elements 
dealing with information and information processing, i.e. a matter of cognitive 
coordination (Coriat and Weinstein, 2002, p. 276). With an endogenous institutional 
approach on how public agencies adopt innovation comes the interesting question of 
how adoption may be propelled or hindered because of institutions typically 
prevailing within organisations. Such institutional elements may manifest as internal 
rules, formal power structures, work descriptions, assigned budgets, contracts,   13
incentive structures etc. may affect to what extent information is utilised by 
individuals. Therefore, as a second step, the analysis will focus on the identification 
and discussion of the endogenous institutions and their role in preventing or enabling 
diffusion of innovation.  
 
4. Innovation Diffusion in a Large Health Organisation 
 
This section starts with an introduction of the case, sections 4.1 and 4.2, followed by a 
discussion on the characteristics of the innovation to be diffused in section 4.3. In 
section 4.4 different procurement framework agreements are discussed. Section 4.5 
describes an exogenous institution affecting the diffusion of innovation. Section 4.6 
concludes with a discussion on endogenous institutions and diffusion. 
 
4.1 Setting the Scene 
 
The National Health Service (NHS) was established after the Second World War to 
provide health care for everyone resident in the UK and is today one of the largest 
organisations in the word employing roughly 1.3 million people (Lister, 2004). The 
cost of running the NHS is estimated to £100 billion and financed entirely by tax 
money. Although private health care exists, 92% of the population rely on NHS care 
(Wikipedia, 2008). NHS consists of an array of different health care providers and 
administrative functions. The health care providers are organised in different types of 
trusts; e.g. Primary Care Trusts, NHS Hospital Trusts (or Acute Trusts), or NHS 
Hospitals. NHS falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of Health. Under the 
Department of Health is the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency (PASA). NHS 
PASA used to perform public procurement for the benefit of NHS health care 
providers. Nowadays this organisation has been given a more strategic role regarding 
public procurement. The purpose with this organisation is “to ensure that the NHS in 
England makes the most effective use of its resources by getting the best possible 
value for money when purchasing goods and services” (NHS PASA, 2008). Since 
2006, central public procurement is managed by the NHS Supply Chain under the 
NHS Business Services Authority. As will be further developed below there are 
several channels for which suppliers can use in order to diffuse their products into the 
NHS organisation. These different supply routes also have different institutional 
characteristics that may affect diffusion within the organisation. 
 
4.2 Public Procurement of a Solution  
 
This case concerns the problems with Catheter Associated Urinary Tract Infections 
(CAUTIs) and can be seen as a special chapter of the general issue of combating 
infectious deceases, which has been a challenge for health care agencies globally 
through out history. In the last decades of the 20
th century one specific area emerged 
as particularly problematic in UK. This was the increasing problems with health care 
associated infections or as it used to be called, hospital acquired infections, i.e. that 
infections were transmitted to patients seeking care at NHS facilities. Four major 
problematic areas are infections of the urinary tract, surgical-wound infections, lower-  14
respiratory tract and skin infections (Emmerson et al, 1996) where the most common 
of these are urinary infections (see also Department of Health, 2003). Thus, in 2002, 
health care associated infection were identified as “a major problem for the NHS” 
(Department of Health, 2002, p. 62) and therefore listed as one of the key areas that 
should be prioritised in order “to combat the present as well as the possible future 
threat posed by infectious diseases” (ibid, p. 22). Apart from suffering imposed on 
individual patients, heath care associated infections are also costly for the health care 
system. Costs for these infections have been estimated to £930 million per annum in 
England, where £124 million are imposed by urinary tract infections (Plowman et al, 
2001).  
 
Many factors drive the increase of healthcare associated infections. Factors are for 
instance the increased number of patients with severe illnesses in the health care 
system as patients in worse condition become more vulnerable to infections; but it can 
also be therapeutic factors, i.e. that indwelling catheters need to be used to help curing 
patients; organisational factors, e.g. poor staff to patient ratio; or behavioural factors 
such as poor compliance with hygiene standards (Department of Health, 2003). 
Guidelines have also been developed to address these areas (Pratt et al, 2007). These 
guidelines are also made accessible to NHS employees through an award-winning e-
learning project (Pratt and O’Malley (2007). The interest in this paper concerns 
another element that may contribute in the battle against healthcare associated 
infections, namely adoption of new technology. In general, promoting the adoption of 
innovation within organisations appears to be a rather underdeveloped area and is still 
listed under ‘Areas for Further Research’ (Pratt, et al, 2007).  
 
4.3 Adoption Characteristics  
 
The implicit basic concern in diffusion studies is adoption rate. Following Rogers, 
adoption rates are determined by characteristics which are related to the innovation 
per se; its relative advantage; the degree of which it is compatible with existing 
structures; its complexity; its trialability; and observability (Rogers, 195).  In this 
section this framework is drawn upon to discuss the current case. 
 
In order to increase adoption an innovation needs to have a relative advantage to the 
idea it is potentially about to supersede. The innovation in this case was the Bardex IC 
silver alloy coated hydrogel catheter, supplied in UK by Bard Ltd. This was a catheter 
originally developed and sold on the US market. What distinguished the Bardex 
catheter from conventional catheters were anti-infective properties achieved through 
the silver coating used (c.f. NHS PASA-CEP, 2006). The supplier had provided 
information about the scientific background of the product, the evidence that showed 
it had antibacterial properties and then the most important factor in terms of 
implementation in a health setting, evidence that using it in certain population groups 
would actually reduce the number of health care associated infections.  
 
In this case, the relative advantage can be understood from the general problem 
described above, i.e. how to decrease the incidence of CAUTIs. Approximately 40% 
of all hospital-acquired infections are catheter associated urinary tract infections 
(Davenport and Keeley, 2005, p. 298). In this regard the role of medical devices “is 
emphasised by the 80% of urinary infections that are traced to indwelling urinary   15
catheters” (Department of Health, 2003, p. 8). Several attempts have been made to use 
certain substances on catheters to prevent bacterial colonization of internal and 
external surfaces of catheters (Davenport and Keeley, 2005). The relative advantage 
with the Bardex silver coated catheter as compared to conventional catheters comes 
from the silver coating which reduce the risk of infection. A literature review of 
studies of the effects of using silver coated catheters concluded that “[s]ilver-coated 
hydrogel catheters reduce CAUTIs” (ibid, 2005, p. 302).  
 
Compatibility with existing values, past experiences and needs of potential adopters is 
also important for the diffusion (Rogers, 1995). Although the silver coating of the 
Bardex catheter differs from conventional catheters and other attempted alternative 
solutions, the Bardex catheter is essentially a component innovation. It is used in the 
same way and in the same contexts as would conventional catheters and any special 
training for its use is not required of medical staff. The adoption of this innovation can 
take place without any systematic reconfiguration or alteration of architectural 
knowledge in the organisation (c.f. Henderson and Clark, 1990). In principle it is 
designed to solve the same problem as conventional catheters. Based on these 
arguments the Bardex catheter appears to concur with the compatibility requirements.  
 
Closely related to compatibility requirement is complexity, i.e. the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as difficult to understand and use. Following Rogers (1995, p. 
16) innovations which are “readily understood by most member of the system” will be 
adopted faster as compared to innovations of greater complexity. As far as this study 
goes, nothing embedded in the technology per se suggests that the degree of 
complexity in the Bardex catheter should reduce the adoption rate to a great extent.  
 
Following Rogers “the essence of the diffusion process is the information exchange 
through which one individual communicates a new idea to one or several others” 
(Roger, 1995, p. 18). Information per se is however not necessarily sufficient for 
attaining a high rate of adoption. One must also take into account the social system 
and that “[t]he structure of a social system can facilitate or impede the diffusion of 
innovations in a system” (Rogers, 1995, p. 25). Following Savory (2009), NHS is an 
organisation strongly influenced by scientific ideals where ‘scientific facts´ or 
‘evidence´ are elements which have implications for trialability and observability.  As 
discussed by this authour (Savory, 2009, p. 157), “[t]he cultural propensity for 
scientific knowledge leads to initiatives being led by scientific method… [and the] 
requirement for new practices to be rigorously tested…” before adopted in practice. In 
spite of available clinical evidence based on research conducted in the US, local 
adoption decisions required local rigorous testing and verification by, for instance 
results published by other health care centres in the UK. This means that diffusion 
within the NHS is different from e.g. end-consumer products, where trialability and 
observability can take place as rather informal events. In this sense, the scientific 
rigorousness can be seen as an institutional barrier that, if nothing else, slows down 
the diffusion pace. 
 
4.4 Multiple Supply Routes 
 
Within the NHS there is no stipulated route for the supply of consumables. Any single 
NHS trust may utilise supply routes as they find most appropriate. In principle (for the   16
purposes here) there are three routes for supply of consumables to a NHS hospital. 
Products can be ordered through an electronic ordering system, Logistics On-Line 
(LOL). The products that are in this electronic catalogue are supplied from one of the 
six regional stores managed by the NHS Supply Chain (formerly NHS Logistics). A 
second option is to order directly from a supplier through a framework agreement 
negotiated centrally. These products are available online through the NHS E-Cat. 
These orders are placed directly to the suppliers with a reference to the framework 
contract number, and the supplier will deliver directly to the specified address and 
invoice the Trust directly. It is also possible to order from contracts set up through 
public procurement on the local level. Similar to ordering from framework 
agreements provided centrally (managed earlier by NHS PASA and nowadays by the 
NHS Supply Chain), the supplier delivers to a specified address and invoice directly 
the Trust.  
 
These three supply routes differ in terms of the administrative complexity. 
Procurement through the NHS Supply Chain is the most straightforward as it is 
simply about ordering from the LOL. Buying products included in the NHS PASA 
framework agreements as published in the E-Cat requires awareness of the specific 
contracts as well as interaction with the supplier and is therefore slightly more 
demanding and time consuming. The third option, to manage the complete 
procurement process locally, is the most complex, as it requires development of 
contract specification, going through award procedures to find suppliers, and in the 
case of framework agreements ordering products. 
 
The default supply route for catheters into a NHS ward is through the NHS supply 
chain which is managed in a rather operational manner. For a nurse with 
responsibility for replenishing the stock of catheters on a ward, to order new catheter 
would be a routine task accomplished through the use of an electronic system. 
Deliveries come once a week in appropriate packages and the invoice will typically be 
handled by the supplies department at the hospital. A new alternative product that is 
not in the LOL system may face some difficulties to compete with existing products 
as it may be difficult to make people switch away from an easy supply route. 
 
To order a product that is not in the system would possibly require the submission of 
a (paper) requisition and also interaction with the hospital’s suppliers department. 
This would also probably require more time, especially if the order is about something 
that is different. It might be the case that the wanted product is on a framework 
agreement administrated by the suppliers department. This is however also a longer 
and a more complex process than just ordering from an electronic system. 
 
The beneficial aspects of institutions as well as the potential for mismatch problems 
were discussed in the theoretical background above. From an institutional perspective 
there are obvious advantages with centrally procured framework agreements. From 
the perspective of the daily operations on a hospital ward for instance, supply of 
catheters would preferably take place as straight rebuys. These are routine 
transactions requiring a minimum of new information and consideration of new 
alternatives (Robinson et al, 1997). On the other hand, for a new product not in the 
systems and therefore more difficult to access, the same routines become an 
institutional barrier as they may reduce both trialability and observability for an 
innovation. The following paragraph discusses some attempts to break this barrier.   17
 
4.5 The Rapid Review Panel for the Bardex Catheter 
 
In August 2004 the Rapid Review Panel was set up. Run by the Health Protection 
Agency on behalf of the Department of Health, the purpose with the panel was to 
encourage industry to come with ideas that would tackle the problems related to 
health care associated infection. The panel’s task was to “assess new and novel 
equipment, materials, and other products or protocols that may be of value to the NHS 
in improving hospital infection control and reducing hospital acquired infections” 
(Health Protection Agency, 2006). It is up to companies to submit evidence that they 
have a product that has some new properties and that it will control or reduce 
infection.  
 
One of the first products submitted to the Rapid Review Panel was the Bardex 
catheter. The Rapid Review Panel agreed that it was a good product, it was new, it 
had anti bacterial activity and that there were evidence that it would reduce the 
number of catheter associated infections if used in patents needing catheterisation for 
more than 48 hours. As one of very few products, the Bardex catheter received the top 
mark, i.e. the judgment was that it had “shown benefits that should be [made] 
available to NHS” (ibid, 2006).  
 
As a response to the result of the Rapid Review Panel, NHS PASA “fast tracked” the 
Bardex catheter into the NHS Supply Chain. When the Bardex catheter was 
introduced in England 2002, initially the only supply route available was the most 
complex one, i.e. it was neither available on contract and neither was it in stock. 
When it became available from the NHS Supply Chain, in September 2005, roughly a 
year after the Rapid Review Panel had published their results, the use of the product 
increased. In 2006, about 30 NHS hospitals were using the Bardex catheter. The 
estimated marked share for products in its range was at the time 2-3%. In USA the 
same catheter had a market share around 40%. 
 
It should be noted that from a clinical point of view, the Rapid Review Panel had a 
strictly indicative function. The pane makes statements based on evidence taken into 
account whether or not a product does what is says it does, as reported from other 
studies. The panel does neither recommend nor provide mandatory directives whether 
or not to use a certain product. In the general case, the decision to use the Bardex 
catheter is made by clinicians. What did happen as a result of the panel’s judgement 
was that the Bardex catheter was brought into the NHS supply chain by NHS PASA 
faster than it would have without the top grading given by the Rapid Review Panel. 
Without it, any clinician in a hospital championing the Bardex catheter would have 
had to go through the procurement process as discussed in section 4.4. 
 
From an institutional perspective, the setting up of the Rapid Review Panel can be 
seen as an attempt to re-design the institutional set-up created by the NHS supply 
chain. From the perspective of the actual potential users of the catheter, the Rapid 
Review Panel was an exogenous institution (Jacoby, 1990). As will be discussed in 
the following also other institutional levels may be important to take into account. For 
instance, different endogenous (ibid, 1990) institutions may also affect the diffusion 
process.   18
 
4.6 The Role of Endogenous Institutions 
 
In the first years of the diffusion process of the Bardex catheter, it prevailed among 
NHS clinicians, infection control staff and continence advisors scepticism about the 
evidence base. NHS staff did not necessarily subscribe to the view that the silver 
coating used on the Bardex catheter would help reducing health care associated 
infections. Although there is no sign of studies that challenge the general view that the 
Bardex catheter does what the supplier claims, the critique that has arisen concerns 
the limitations of the referred studies. As it seems, within the time frame of this study, 
the Rapid Review Panel’s rather encouraging statement about the Bardex catheter did 
not in itself lead to increased speed of the diffusion process. The organised scepticism 
illustrates well the double aspect of institutions discussed buy Coriat and Weinstein 
(2002). An institution work both as a constraint or as a resource (ibid, 2002, p.  283). 
The requirement for evidence of an innovative product’s claimed properties is central 
to any organisation providing health care. From a diffusion perspective these 
requirements tend to work as a barrier for diffusion. 
 
What is often emphasised as a significant element in diffusion processes is the role of 
innovation champions.  These are typically “powerful individuals” (Rogers, 1995, p. 
398) who promote the innovation within an organisation, or implementing leaders 
enabling collective learning (Edmondson et al, 2001). What has been suggested a 
problem in the case of catheters in general relates to the way catheters are used within 
health care organisations. As different from e.g. wound infections which much clearer 
falls under the responsibility of surgical units, the problems related to catheters are not 
as easily connected to a specific unit. Catheters are used in operating departments, in 
accident emergency services, post operatively, in any medical unit or ward. This 
means that ownership of the problem becomes less clear and the emergence of 
innovation champions specifically devoted to catheters is not promoted. 
 
As was discussed above, the need for an innovation is central to diffusion. What 
seems to be common among the hospitals which early adopted the Bardex catheter is 
that within these organisations prevailed a clear perception of the need to prevent and 
control health care associated infections. In these hospitals clear business cases were 
developed displaying the current level of catheter associated infections, their cost, and 
the expected benefit from introducing the Bardex catheter. What also seems to be a 
common theme is that the decision to introduce the Bardex catheter for a hospital was 
often made centrally, perhaps by the overall financial budget holder for the whole 
organisation. Some of the hospitals that were among the first in England to introduce 
the Bardex catheter did that through an authority innovation-decision (Rogers, 1995, 
p. 372). While introducing the order codes for the Bardex catheter in the ordering 
system, they excluded the possibility to order traditional catheters. 
 
One issue related to the diffusion of the Bardex catheter was also the problem of 
evaluating the economic benefits of using the product. Compared with traditional 
catheters, the Bardex catheter was more expensive. Studies indicated, however, that 
although the Bardex catheter would be more expensive per unit, it would still save 
money in the end, as it would reduce the risk for patients to contract health care 
associated infections, and avoid unnecessary hospitalisation. Arguing for using a new   19
catheter that is more expensive than the ones currently in use also touches upon a 
generic problem of public health care and the nature of ’saving’ by improving health 
care. Although the use of the Bardex catheter might mean that unnecessary 
hospitalisation can be avoided, the savings are not clearly visible. The reason for this 
is because it is hard to measure the value of what is not spent. Also, what is 
unavoidable for new products is that independent studies of economic benefits are not 
available (Williams and Bryan, 2007). One way of attaining evidence of economical 
benefits is through historical studies of the same care unit, where comparison between 
usage of conventional catheters and Bardex catheters is possible (Rupp et al, 2004). It 
is however in the nature of such studies that they take time. 
 
Another problem relates to the way budgets are organised. In some cases the potential 
benefits of the introduction of the Bardex catheter would not be visible in the budget 
affected by the increased spending on a more expensive catheter. Although total cost 
would be lower for the hospital, the incentives for a financial manager responsible for 
a budget to accept a cost without gaining anything would be low. Similar experiences 
have been made by other companies attempting to introduce innovations to the NHS. 
“[T]here is a major problem in gaining acceptance into the NHS due to budget silos – 
where the purchasing department bears the brunt of the cost while the savings are 
passed onto another department” (Levinson, 2006, p. 10). These problems related to 
the “separation of appraisal and resource allocation functions” have also been brought 
up by researchers (Williams and Bryan, 2007, p. 2127). Even if it would be possible 
to establish the economic benefits (supported in e.g. Rupp et al, 2004) from using 
Bardex catheters, it would still be impossible for a procurement department which has 
not been provided with the means to cover the excess cost associated with the 
adoption of Bardex catheter. One way of removing this barrier, which has been 
successfully attempted in hospitals, is to internally fund the increased cost. This 
means that resources are put aside to cover the extra cost associated with procuring 
the Bardex catheter with a higher per-unit price in order to save money due to 
reduction in total hospitalisation time.  
 
In one sense also existing framework agreements work as institutional barriers. This is 
what following Coriat and Weinstein (2002) could be called a Type 2/ Type B (i.e. 
endogenous, fixed-term) institutional barrier, i.e. the time delay imposed on adoption 
decisions as resources are tied in current contracts. Even if an adopting unit would 
like to change catheter, they would generally wait until current contracts are about to 
be re-negotiated. One interviewee highlighted that the evaluation is not only about the 
Bardex catheter versus traditional catheters. In an economic organisation there might 
also be other priorities or potentially beneficial activities to consider that would 
improve the health service. This issue, more generally formulated, concerns the 
importance of de-spending. Even in situations where there are sufficient levels of 
evidence verifying that a new product is beneficial, the questions remains, what other 
item should be removed from the budget in order to allow for the introduction of the 
new (Williams and Bryan, pp. 2125-2126). In that sense, diffusion has its own version 
of creative destruction. 
 
The institutional barriers encountered as well as some of the measures made to 
negotiate them are summarised in table 1 (below).  
 









































































Table 1. Institutional barriers to adoption identified and corresponding co-ordination activities. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper adds to recent literature dealing with public procurement as a means to 
stimulate innovation – an endeavour justifiable in the light of the current interest 
among policy makers on how to use public procurement as a means to stimulate 
innovation. The paper focuses on a relatively neglected area, namely diffusion and 
adoption of innovations in public procurement. Theoretically, innovation and 
diffusion are seen essentially as a social process, determined by institutions, which my 
or may not enable diffusion. Therefore, institutional coordination may at times be 
necessary in order to achieve diffusion. Although the perception of institutions as 
elements working on different societal levels is well established in the literature there 
is however a tendency to limit institutional analysis of innovation to include only 
exogenous levels. The argument brought forward here is that also endogenous   21
institutions need to be taken into account as they too may act as barriers for 
innovation and diffusion. Similarly, endogenous institutions should also be 
incorporated in coordination and institutional re-design. 
 
In the paper, some structures treated as institutional barriers inhibiting the diffusion of 
the Bardex IC silver alloy coated hydrogel catheter into the National Health Service 
are discussed. One such institutional barrier manifests in the necessity for a product to 
get into the NHS supply chain. If a product can be accessed through ordinary supply 
systems, this enables diffusion to a larger extent as compared to products that require 
additional administrative overhead in order to become supplied. Another requirement 
relates to organised scepticism concerning scientific evidence verifying benefits of an 
innovation. One view prevailing within the NHS was that the evidence was not 
sufficient in order to justify adoption. Also, in comparison to other health care 
technologies more directly connected to a specific medical speciality catheters lack a 
clear champion who would be willing to promote diffusion. The decentralised 
organisation structure of the NHS work as a barrier in the sense that a decision to 
adopt or reject a certain innovation typically is made locally and cannot be controlled 
centrally. Although the Bardex catheter was introduced at a higher price per unit than 
conventional catheters currently in use, the institutional problem concerned more the 
way budgets are organised rather than the price difference itself. Silo budgeting 
created disincentives for diffusion although evidence suggested that the Bardex 
catheter would be more efficient in the long run.   
 
Several examples of institutional re-design and coordination were also discussed. One 
such measure was the establishment of the Rapid Review Panel. The approving 
results of the evaluation made by the Rapid Review Panel helped to reduce the time 
for the Bardex catheter to get into the NHS Supply Chain. As a response to the 
perceived deficiencies regarding evidence, several studies generating more evidence 
were conducted. Other actions discussed were the effort to make the problem of 
CAUTIs explicit to hospital management; development of clear business cases; 
making authority-based innovation-decisions; and reallocating resources to enable 
diffusion.  
 
One conclusion that can be made from this specific case is that co-ordination and 
institutional re-design should be regarded as a central activity in public procurement 
of innovation. This means that definitions of public procurement of innovation 
should, in order to be useful, go beyond just including the moment where “a public 
agency places an order for something which does not exist” (Edquist et al, 2002, p. 5). 
The case also emphasise the role of institutions as barriers for innovation and 
diffusion, which makes diffusion more an issue concerning institutions than just 
simply a matter of information and decision. This is especially important to take into 
account when an innovation involves adopting units where the “common goal” may 
vary slightly (Rogers, 1995, p. 23), as can be expected in an organisation such as the 
NHS. Furthermore, in principle, all the institutional barriers discussed in this case 
belong to the endogenous level. This in turn justifies an understanding of institutional 
coordination and re-design where also endogenous levels should be taken into 
account. 
 
Introducing new equipment in an organisation should involve not only an assessment 
of the new product’s actual technical capabilities. Economical considerations and   22
potentially other measures that can be used to create incentives that would enable 
diffusion in the organisation should also be taken into account. That is also a 
proposition that harmonises well with initiatives made to establish a Centre for 
Evidence Based Purchasing within the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency. This is 
an organisation that was set up to “underpin purchasing decisions by providing 
objective evidence to support the uptake of useful, safe, innovative products…” (NHS 
PASA, 2006). Sufficient information about a new product’s benefits and evidence that 
would justify adoption from an economical perspective may still not be sufficient for 
successful diffusion. As pointed out here, also different institutional barriers may need 
to be identified and negotiated. As was brought up in the case, this may involve 
coordination of research and evaluation, fast-tracking new products in to the supply-
chain and also overcome institutional barriers within the organisation.  
 
Systemic approaches to innovation studies emphasise the interaction and feedback 
between elements such as research, invention, innovation and production (Kline and 
Rosenberg, 1986). This is essentially a critique against a linear view of how 
innovation occurs. There is also a tendency to neglect these characteristics in the 
diffusion of innovations. This paper provides a basis for challenging the view “that 
technological diffusion proceeds in an autonomous manner, guided efficiently and 
effectively by the invisible hand of the market…” (Alic, 2008, p. 23).  Although 
information of an innovation may be available, different institutional barriers may 
inhibit further diffusion within an organisation (c.f. Edquist and Johnson, 1997). The 
actions taken, the results rendered and the remaining barriers in the case studied here 
all point to the fact that diffusion of innovation cannot be dealt with in a linear 
fashion. Rather, it requires institutional coordination and design on many institutional 
levels in research, on the national level, within trusts, hospitals and the individual 
level in health care units. As demonstrated in the case discussed in this paper, also 
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